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Abstract 
 
Innovation paradoxes refer broadly to a family of anomalous observations 
highlighting that outstanding innovation efforts, including investments in them, lead 
to either insignificant or undesirable economic outcomes in terms of wealth, 
employment and competitiveness. While such paradoxes have been recorded and 
investigated since the late 1980s, there is still not a published review paper, or 
chapter, on the subject in the extant literature. This paper fills this gap, by reviewing 
the empirical literature of two of the most popular innovation paradoxes in 
innovations studies, that of the European Paradox and of the Swedish Paradox. The 
results show that, despite key differences in terms of both conceptualisation and unit 
of analysis, empirical research in both paradoxes has processed along similar lines, 
leading to a four-fold typology of explanations. Lastly, the paper discusses some 
important observations relevant for innovation theory, research and policy, as well as 
it discusses directions for future research.  
Keywords: Innovation paradoxes, European paradox, Swedish paradox, Literature 
Review 
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 1. Introduction 
 
 Innovation paradoxes consist of a family of anomalous observations 
highlighting that outstanding innovation activities, or investments in them (however 
both of these are defined and measured) lead to either insignificant or undesirable 
economic outcomes in terms of wealth, employment and competitiveness. In other 
words, an innovation paradox highlights that innovation may not always be beneficial 
for the economic entity under consideration, be it a nation, a region or a sector. In this 
broad sense, the essence of an innovation paradox lies in the tension between 
expectation (theory) and observation (practice).  
 More specifically, following the writings of the old-master of all innovation 
scholars, that of Joseph Schumpeter (1942;1934), innovation theory in general, and 
the economics of innovation in particular, maintain that innovation is, for although 
various reasons (e.g., productivity growth, competitiveness, knowledge spillovers, 
entrepreneurship, and variety in the economic system that leads to sectoral expansion 
and diversification), the engine of capitalist economic progress and human progress 
(e.g., Castellacci, 2007; Grossman and Helpman, 1994; Romer, 1990; Nelson and 
Winter, 1982). This assumption has, over the past four decades or so, inspired not 
only numerous empirical studies, but it has also prompted the introduction of 
numerous innovation policies across the world. For instance, the great majority of 
innovation policies is grounded on the assumption that investing in innovation 
activities (especially in research and development (R&D) activities) is equivalent of 
boosting the growth and competitiveness of the economic entity under consideration 
(e.g., Gackstatter et al., 2012; Archibugi and Coco, 2005); with the Lisbon Strategy in 
general, and the 3 per cent R&D expenditure of gross domestic product (GDP) target 
in particular, being among the most prominent examples. 
 However, several empirical observations (e.g., Fragkandreas, 2013; Edquist 
and McKelvey, 1998; Jones, 1995) have illustrated over the past two decades or so 
that this is not always the case; or better it is not in the manner suggested (e.g., ―scale 
effects‖, i.e., an increase devoted in the resources of innovation should increase the 
growth rate of the economy) by the mainstream endogenous strand of the economics 
of innovation (e.g., Castellacci, 2007; 2005; Grossman and Helpman, 1994; Romer, 
1990). Goven the inconsistency between the scale effects assumption and empirical 
observation, it is, by no means, surprising that innovation paradoxes are the subject of 
an extensive empirical research; for instance, a random search on Google Scholar 
with the term ―innovation paradox‖ yields 1,100 results, searched on 11th January 
2015. The very existence of such paradoxes, therefore, illustrates the inherent 
limitations of the scale effects assumption; an assumption central not only to the 
mainstream strand of the economics of innovation (e.g., Castellacci, 2007; Romer, 
1990), but also to numerous innovation policies across the globe (e.g., Gackstatter et 
al., 2012). Because of this, scientific research on innovation paradoxes has attracted 
not only the attention of policy-makers, but also their financial support. 
 Given the increasing interest of both innovation scholars and policy-makers on 
innovation paradoxes, as well as the policy implications that stem from research on 
such paradoxes, one may rightly expect to find a few review publications on the 
subject in the literature. Unfortunately, there is a significant deficiency of meta-
analytical contributions on the subject. In fact, and despite two years of research on 
innovation paradoxes, no such review contribution has been published so far
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neglect carries some crucial implications for not only our understanding of the nature 
and causes of innovation paradoxes, but also of several research-informed innovation 
policies that seek to address the causes that bring about the innovation paradox under 
consideration. To put it simply, our understanding of the nature and causes of such 
paradoxes looks - at least to an outsider – quite fragmented and conformational: it is 
mostly based on the results of individual studies, most of which, and as will be shown 
through this paper, offer not only competing explanations for the occurrence of an 
innovation paradox, but also contradictory policy suggestions.  
 The paper provides an extensive survey on the literature of two of the most 
popular innovation paradoxes in innovation studies, that of the European paradox and 
of the Swedish paradox. Despite referring to different units of analysis (i.e., nation 
and a union of nations), both paradoxes under consideration highlight that outstanding 
innovation activities generate little economic returns, especially in terms of promising 
innovations, employment, wealth and international competitive advantage. In other 
words, both paradoxes demonstrate ―...the disappointment of economic growth that 
did not seem to respond to high levels of investment in knowledge...such as human 
capital, R&D and patents, as well as broader aspects such as creativity‖ (Audretsch, 
2009a: 250). By reviewing the literature on innovation paradoxes, the paper attempts 
to identify a few common theoretically-informed and empirically-verified (or 
grounded) explanations. In doing so, the paper aims to extend and deepen in a meta-
analytical manner our understanding of the nature and causes of the paradoxes under 
consideration. In addition, the paper identifies a few unaddressed research issues and 
gaps that merit the attention of both innovation scholars and policy makers. All in all, 
the paper aims to make a meta-theoretical contribution to the literature on innovation 
paradoxes, meaning also that one of the secondary purposes lies in the ability of the 
paper to offer a 'compass' to the relevant literature to both newcomers and seasoned 
researchers interested in learning about or investigating innovation paradoxes.   
 This paper is structured as follows. The next two sections review the empirical 
literatures on the European and the Swedish paradox. The penultimate section 
identifies a few empirically-verified or ground explanations, common to both 
literatures under consideration. Lastly, the final section summarises the main findings 
of this paper; it also provides suggestions, and discusses some important observations 
and issues that merit the attention of both innovation scholars and policy makers. 
 
2. European Paradox 
 As mentioned in the introductory section, innovation paradoxes consists of a 
several anomalous observations illustrating the tension between innovation theory and 
empirical research; or better they illustrate the existence of a gap between expectation 
and observation. With a certain degree of arbitrariness, one may identify several 
innovation paradoxes in the social scientific literature (for a selective list of 
innovation paradoxes, see Table 1). The present section reviews the relevant literature 
of one of the most popular innovation paradoxes in the literature of innovation 
studies, that of the European Paradox.  
 According to the Green Paper on Innovation (European Commission, 1995), 
the European Union (EU) suffers from a series of weaknesses; among others, the first 
of these refers to investments in R&D activities. It is argued, in particular, that 
compared to United States (US) and Japan, the EU invests on average less in R&D 
activities (see also the discussion in Archibugi and Cocco, 2005). The second 
weakness refers to the lack of coordination in terms of R&D activities, programmes 
and strategies across Europe. However, the greatest of all weakness is, according to 
the Green Paper, the European paradox, i.e., the inability of the EU to transform 
―...the results of technological research and skills into innovations and competitive 
advantage‖ (European Commission, 1995:5).  
 Table 1 – Selected innovation paradoxes 
Name Description Main Source 
European 
paradox 
The Europe paradox refers to the inability of the European Union in 
terms of transforming its scientific excellence into innovation, 
competitive advantage, wealth and employment. 
European 
Commission 
(1995) 
European 
regional paradox 
The European regional paradox refers to the observation that some 
of the most innovation-intensive regions in Europe do not only 
grow at a slower pace, but they also present lower income per 
capita and employment statistics than the national average under 
consideration.   
Fragkandreas 
(2013) 
―Scale effects‖ 
paradox (also 
known as Jones 
critique) 
The scale effects paradox refers to the observation that while the 
number of scientists engaged in research and development (R&D) 
in advanced countries has grown dramatically over the last 40 
years, the growth rates of advanced countries have either exhibited 
a constant mean or even declined on average. 
Jones (1995) 
Regional 
innovation 
paradox 
The regional innovation paradox refers to the apparent contradiction 
between the comparatively greater need to spend on innovation in 
lagging regions of Europe and their relatively lower capacity to 
absorb public funds earmarked for the promotion of innovation 
activities.  
Oughton et al. 
(2003) 
Solow paradox 
(also known as 
IT-paradox) 
 The Solow paradox is based on Robert Solow's observation ―[y]ou 
can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity 
statistic‖. In other words, investments in generalised purpose 
innovations (e.g. the computer) and related technologies do not pay-
off.  
Solow (1987) 
Swedish 
paradox 
A generalised version of the paradox refers to the observation that 
outstanding investments in R&D and innovation-related activities 
generate little economic return in terms of competitiveness, growth 
and employment.  
Ejermo et al. 
(2011); Edquist 
and McKelvey, 
1998) 
 
 The underlying observation of the European paradox raises two important 
questions (European Commission, 2003): the first one pertains to the efficiency of the 
European scientific system, i.e., ―[d]oes the European science system fail to produce 
the kind of research upon which advanced industrial economies have become 
increasingly dependent?” (p. 413); and the second one relates to the European 
industrial base, i.e. does the European industry ―...lack the ability and/or absorptive 
capacity to use the knowledge produced in the science sector effectively?‖ (ibid.). 
These two questions, therefore, imply that an answer to the European paradox lies in 
the domain(s) of either/both scientific base or/and industrial base.  
 The first scientific study to cast some light on the matter was that of Tijssen 
and van Wijk (1999). Specifically, the authors examined in a comparative fashion 
(e.g., US and Japan) the scientific performance of the EU in terms of scientific 
publications and citations in three leading technological fields, that of computers, data 
processing, and telecommunications. The findings do not only confirm the leading 
position of the EU in these fields, they also identify a serious weakness on the part of 
the European information, communication and technologies (ICT) industry. In 
particular, the study shows that the European ICT industry lacks the necessary 
abilities with regards to developing and commercialising the results of promising 
scientific research (see also Dosi et al., 2006: 1456-1460).  
 However, the European Commission (2007; 2003) has argued on several 
occasions that it is not only the European industry that fails to take an advantage of 
promising research activities, but also the European academic system. In particular, it 
is argued that, compared to that of the US, the European scientific system fails to 
transform the results of publicly-funded research activities into wealth and 
employment-generation innovations. As the EC puts it in one of its reports ―[o]ne 
important problem is how to make better use of publicly funded R&D‖ (European 
Commission 2007, p. 7). According to the same report, one of the main reasons for 
this inability is that ―[c]ompared to North America, the average university in Europe 
generates far fewer inventions and patents...‖, and this ―...is largely due to a less 
systematic and professional management of knowledge and intellectual property by 
European universities‖ (ibid.).  
 The above conclusion has triggered several policy responses in the form of 
institutional reforms across Europe (Jacobsson et al., 2013; Geuna and Rossi, 2011). 
Since the late 1990s, several European countries (e.g., Austrian, Denmark, Finland, 
Germany and Norway) have either modified or replaced the traditional inventor 
ownership model of academic patent rights (i.e. the so-called professor's privilege) by 
which the sole owners of publicly funded research discoveries are the researchers), 
with a US-inspired institutional ownership model (i.e. the so-called 'Bayh–Dole Act' 
model) by which publicly funded research results are owned by the scientific 
institutions. In other words, the widespread belief that EU under-performs in the 
commercialization of publicly funded research has been followed by the relevant 
policy response, that of transferring the ownership of intellectual property rights to 
scientific institutions.  
 However, several studies (e.g., Lawton Smith et al., 2013, Jacobsson et al., 
2013; Conti and Gaule, 2011; Conti and Gaule, 2011) indicate that the belief of an 
inefficient European academic system is to a large extent flawed. Conti and Gaule 
(2011), for instance, seek to find out whether the US technology transfer offices are 
more productive, in terms of both licence agreements and revenue, than the European 
offices. The findings show that EU technology transfer offices are as productive in 
terms of license agreements as the US offices. However, the EU offices seem to earn 
significantly less from licenses than the US offices. Conti and Gaule (2011) put 
forward two hypotheses for this observation: (i) US offices place greater emphasis on 
revenues than EU offices; and (ii) US offices employ more experienced in business 
employees than the EU offices. Regarding (i), Conti and Gaule found that the EU 
offices place the same degree of attention as the US offices do; regarding (ii), they 
found that their proxies on experienced stuff had a positive and statistically significant 
impact on revenues, suggesting that the US offices hire more experienced employees 
in business than the EU offices.  
 Recent empirical studies (e.g., Herranz and Ruiz-Castillo, 2013; Bonaccorsi, 
2007; Dosi et al., 2006) indicate that the European paradox has nothing to do with the 
presumed inabilities of the European academic-scientific system. It rather has to do 
with some important methodological issues. Dosi et al. (2006), for instance, argue that 
the European paradox is nothing more than the outcome of mis-calculating and 
reporting the relevant data regarding scientific performance. In particular, they show 
that, after adjusting the data for the population, ―...Europe’s claimed leadership in 
terms of number of publications disappears‖ (Dosi et al., 2006: 1454). In addition, 
Dosi et al., found that, after controlling for both originality and impact of scientific 
publications (e.g., citations), the US is still well ahead in both indicators
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it, the evidence is ―...far from supporting any claim to European leadership in 
science. On the contrary, one observes a structural lag in top-level science vis-`a-vis 
the US, together with (i) a few sectoral outliers in physical sciences and engineering, 
and (ii) a few single institutional outliers (such as Cambridge in computer science 
and a number of other disciplines).‖ (Dosi et al., 2006: 1455).  
 Similarly, several studies (e.g., Herranz and Ruiz-Castillo, 2013; Albarran et 
al., 2010; Bonaccorsi, 2007) have collected and analysed extensive bibliometric data 
with regards to the performance of the EU science base; for example, Herranz and 
Ruiz-Castillo (2013) analysed 3.6 million articles which were published in the period 
between 1998 and 2002 period in 219 fields. While, on the one hand, the findings of 
these studies confirm that the European scientific system outperforms that of the US 
in terms of total publications, these studies show that the European scientific system: 
(i) under-performs in both new and fast-growing scientific fields (e.g., ICT, 
biotechnology, medical sciences); (ii) has, in comparative terms, a poor citation 
performance in the majority of the fields under consideration; as well as that (iii) it is 
highly specialised in slow-growing and mature scientific fields (e.g., physical 
sciences, engineering and mathematics). In a nutshell, these studies raise serious 
doubts on the assumption of a world-leading European science, thus also to the first 
axis of the European paradox. 
 Although the findings of the above studies have shed some light on the nature 
of the European paradox, especially with regards to the input side of the paradox, 
they, nevertheless, raise a few important questions. For instance, why does the 
European science base excels mostly in mature (slow-growing) scientific fields? As 
well as, how can the EU take an economic advantage in the fields that its scientific 
system excels?  
 Regarding the first question, Andrea Bonaccorsi's work (2011; 2007) offers 
some interesting insights. Bonaccorsi (2007) argues that a deeper understanding on 
the question why the European scientific system excels mostly in mature scientific 
fields, requires a shift in our analysis; from analysing contemporary science, 
technology and innovation (STI) policies to the history of scientific institutions in 
Europe. In particular, Bonaccorsi argues that the European scientific system suffers 
from some ―...serious deep-seated institutional features that make it difficult to adapt 
to new search regimes‖ (p.9). Such institutional rigidities seem to be rooted in the 
post-War II period, in which Europe was well prepared to face the infrastructural 
challenges posed by the then promising scientific fields such as chemistry, physics, 
mathematics and engineering. According to Bonaccorsi (2007), the institutional 
infrastructure of the EU (especially of France, Germany and Italy) was unprepared to 
face the challenges posed by the advent of new technologically-oriented scientific 
fields (e.g., ICTs, medical and life sciences), fields characterised by continuous 
radical technological change than by incremental change. To substantiate the above 
claims, Bonaccorsi (2011) provides a comparative historical analysis (e.g., US, United 
Kingdom, Germany and France) of a science-based industry, that of information 
technology (IT). Based on an analysis of the curriculum vitae of the top 1,000 
computer scientists in these countries, Bonaccorsi (2011) finds that it was only in the 
US that the institutional setting was germane to the development of a competitive 
science-based IT industry.  
 Regarding the second question, David Audretsch's work (2009a;2009b) and 
colleagues (Audretsch and Keilbach, 2008) on entrepreneurship offers some 
interesting insights. Audretsch (2009a) argues that fostering the creation of a 
knowledge-based entrepreneurial economy offers a promising resolution to the 
European paradox. In particular, Audretsch and Keilbach (2008) point out that the 
mainstream approach to economic growth (e.g., Romer, 1990) leaves not only the 
question of commercialisation of scientific knowledge largely unaddressed, but also it 
gives the impression that there is an automatic link between investing in scientific 
knowledge and economic growth. As they argue the significance of socio-cultural 
factors – the 'knowledge filter' as they call it - may hinder the commercialisation of 
new scientific knowledge. Audretsch and Keilbach (2008) maintain that 
entrepreneurship overcomes the knowledge filter by transferring knowledge from the 
scientific domain to the economic domain. Therefore, ―entrepreneurship is the 
missing link between investments in new knowledge and economic growth‖ 
(Audretsch, 2009a: 92). On this basis, it is argued that entrepreneurship constitutes a 
promising solution to innovation paradoxes (e.g., Audretsch, 2009a; 2009b; 
Audretsch and Keilbach, 2008). To substantiate their claims, Audretsch and Keilbach 
(2008) develop a production function model, and assess its explanatory power in 440 
German counties (Kreise). The results suggest that ―...not only is entrepreneurial 
activity greater in regions with higher investments in new knowledge, but that also 
those regions with more entrepreneurship exhibit higher growth‖ (p.1698).  
 Having examined the literature of the European paradox, four main 
explanations seem to emerge:  
1. Empirical validity explanation. The underlying observation of the European 
paradox is mostly an outcome of methodological problems, especially with 
regards to measuring scientific performance. 
2. Academic and scientific base explanation. The European academic-scientific 
system fails in comparative terms (e.g., US) to translate the results of scientific 
research into wealth and employment-generating innovations.   
3. Knowledge filter and entrepreneurship explanation. The European paradox is 
caused by social-cultural factors - the knowledge filter – that hinders the 
commercialisation of promising research results. Therefore, and due to its 
ability to overcome the knowledge filter, entrepreneurship is a promising way 
forward.  
4. Industrial base explanation. The European industry fails, for various reasons 
(e.g., lack of investments in R&D, establishing networks with science, etc.), to 
take an advantage of scientific research.  
The next section introduces and reviews the empirical literature of the Swedish 
paradox. It starts with a brief introduction to the Swedish paradox, followed by an 
extensive review.   
 
3. Swedish Paradox 
 
 The Swedish paradox emerged out of a debate in the Swedish-speaking 
literature in the late 1980s (for an overview, see Jacobsson et al. 2013: 875-876). This 
debate was initially prompted by the observation that the relation between R&D 
investments and aggregate economic output statistics (e.g., growth per capita) was 
weak. Since then, different interpretations of the Swedish paradox has been proposed 
(for an overview, see Ejermo and Kander, 2006:9-11). Nevertheless, as emphasised 
elsewhere (Ejermo et al. 2011; Bitard et al., 2008; Jacobsson and Rickne, 2004:1356), 
all versions of the paradox lead - in one way or another - to the same conclusion: 
outstanding investments in innovation activities generate little economic benefits in 
terms of high-tech products, exports, productivity, growth and employment. In other 
words, all versions of the paradox highlight ―...a mismatch between very high values 
on indicators of inputs into innovation and low values on output indicators...‖ (Bitard 
et al., 2008: 240). In this generic sense, the Swedish paradox describes the 
inefficiency of the Swedish economy in terms of transforming innovation inputs into 
innovation and economic outputs. 
 Since the late 1990s, a considerable number of studies have attempted to 
explain the underlying observation of the Swedish paradox – mostly due to the 
political implications that emanate from it (e.g., Jacobsson et al. 2013). This has 
gradually culminated into a noteworthy empirical literature, from which six 
empirically-examined explanations seem to have hijacked the interest of both 
innovation scholars and policy-makers. These are briefly as follows: 
1. Sectoral allocation of R&D activities. Most of R&D expenditures are 
conducted by government-funded organisations; or by multinational 
enterprises (MNEs); or by private firms which grow fast but not as fast as their 
R&D investments.  
2. Knowledge transfer problems and entrepreneurial inabilities. Knowledge 
generated through R&D in either/both scientific organisations or/and corporate 
departments and organisations stays with the borders of these organisations.  
3. Technological Lock-in problems. The Swedish economy is heavily dependent 
upon the innovation abilities of a few successful Swedish MNEs. These firms 
are specialising in non-high-tech and slow-growing sectors of the 
contemporary economic landscape, thus their decisions to invest in high-tech 
innovation strongly affect the economic specialisation of the country.  
4. Globalisation of production: The Swedish economy is dependent upon the 
activities of a few large Swedish MNEs. These MNEs invest heavily in 
innovation within Sweden, but they produce the results of R&D activities in 
other countries. In other words, ―...much of the return on Sweden's R&D 
investments is captured abroad, rather than domestically‖ (Bitard et al., 2008: 
265).  
5. Inefficient innovation system: The national innovation system of Sweden fails, 
for although various reasons, to transform resources devoted to innovation into 
wealth and employment-generating innovations. In other words, the national 
innovation systems suffers from weaknesses that lead to low efficiency.   
6. Theoretical perspective. There is no paradox, it is all a matter of theoretical 
perspective. For instance, if the proportional logic of scale effects is replaced 
by a more nuanced theoretical perspective, there is no reason to expect a 
strong link between innovation inputs and economic outputs.  
 Starting from the first explanation, descriptive empirical evidence provides no 
support to the claim that R&D activities are mostly conducted by government-funded 
organisations. For instance, 74 percent of the total R&D expenditures in Sweden are 
conducted by the business sector (Chaminade et al. 2010: 14). In addition, the 
business sector has increased its share in the total amount spent in R&D activities 
over the past four decades (e.g., Marklund et al., 2004), of which 83 per cent is carried 
out by large firms employing more than 500 employees (Bitard et al., 2008). Ejermo 
and Kander (2006) show that high concentration of R&D activities in a few large 
firms is one of the most persistent and distinctive features of the Swedish economy. 
This, as argued elsewhere (e.g., Bitard et al., 2008; Marklund et al., 2004; Henrekson 
and Jakobsson, 2001; Edquist and McKelvey, 1998), can be attributed to both micro 
(e.g., firm-specific) and macro (e.g., historical, political and institutional) factors, both 
of which will be discussed shortly.  
 While the above studies confirm that most of R&D activities are conducted by 
the business sector, the explanation that government-funded R&D activities are not 
efficient enough has been quite popular in the political discourse of the Swedish 
paradox (e.g., Jacobsson et al., 2013; Granberg and Jacobsson, 2006; Hellström and 
Jacob, 2005; Jacobssson and Rickne, 2004; Henrekson and Rosenberg, 2001). 
Jacobsson et al. (2013) attribute this belief to the policy discourse surrounding the 
European paradox. In particular, they argue that the underlying observation of the 
European paradox has given the impression that the European academic-scientific 
system, including that of Sweden, lacks the abilities to commercialise government-
funded R&D results (see also, the discussion in Goldfarb and Henrekson, 2003). This, 
and in conjunction with the Swedish economic crisis in the early 1990s, triggered 
significant discussion with regards to the institutional and organizational changes that 
are required to increase the efficiency of government-funded R&D activities. In this 
context, the presumed inabilities of the Swedish academic sector has been a recurrent 
theme in policy discussions, reports and empirical studies (Jacobsson et al.,2013; 
Granberg and Jacobsson, 2006).  
 However, several empirical studies (e.g., Jacobsson et al.,2013; Lawton Smith 
et al., 2013; Bitard et al., 2008:245-247; Jacobssson and Rickne, 2004) demonstrate 
that such beliefs rest not only on questionable empirical grounds, but more 
importantly, they are to a large extent erroneous. Jacobsson and Rickne (2004), for 
instance, demonstrate that the supposed inefficiency of the Swedish academic system 
is mostly an outcome of methodological problems. In particular, they show that the 
conventional way of measuring academic R&D expenditure skews the rankings in 
favour of a top position on the part of Sweden. It is argued that most ranking exercises 
neglect the significance of R&D efforts conducted by government and non-
governmental research institutes, the 'extended academic sector' as Jacobsson and 
Rickne (2004: 1361) call it. Taking into account the contribution of the extended 
academic sector, Jacobsson and Rickne (2004) illustrate in a comparative fashion 
(e.g., EU and OECD countries) that the R&D expenditures of the Swedish academic 
system are average in terms of monetary input (e.g., measured as a percentage of 
GDP) and above average in terms of output (e.g., scientific publications per gross 
domestic product). Therefore, Jacobsson and Rickne (2004) argue that the Swedish 
academic system appears to be efficient, not inefficient as believed.  
 However, a recent study sheds new light on the question of sectoral allocation. 
In particular, Ejermo et al.'s study (2011) departs from the observation that most of 
the R&D efforts in Sweden are conducted by firms. Specifically, their study seeks to 
investigate whether the underlying observation of the Swedish paradox ―...is a 
consistent feature across all sectors of the economy, or specific to either fast-growing 
or slow-growing sectors‖ (p.669). Ejermo et al. (2011) distinguish between growing 
and declining sectors, and analyse their long-term R&D patterns in relation to their 
added value for a sixteen year period, between 1985 and 2001. The results show that 
―...the paradox occurs only in fast-growing manufacturing and service sectors‖ not in 
the slow-growing sectors as argued elsewhere (e.g., Edquist and Mckelvey, 1998). 
However, Ejermo et al. seem to neglect the possibility that slow-growing sectors of 
the Swedish economy outsource an important part of their innovation and production 
activities to fast-growing sectors, as well as that fast-growing sectors outsource an 
important part of their production activities abroad, through for instance global 
production networks (e.g., Chaminade et al., 2010). Nevertheless, Ejermo et al.'s 
study has made an important contribution to our understanding of the sectoral 
dimension of the paradox.  
 The second explanation, that of technology transfer problems and inabilities, 
has also received considerable attention from both innovation scholars and policy-
makers. Once again, the Swedish academic system has been at the centre of both 
scholarly and policy attention. Henrekson and Rosenberg (2001), for instance, 
compared the incentive structure for commercialising academic research in Sweden 
with that of the US. The study results indicate that the Swedish incentive structure 
provides far less encouragement than that of the US. Goldfarb and Henrekson (2003) 
attribute this observation to three factors: (i) the top-down nature of the Swedish 
academic system; (ii) the lack of competition among universities in terms of funding 
and personnel; and (iii) to an academic environment that seems to discourage 
researchers from commercializing their ideas. This, as they argue, comes in stark 
contrast with the institutional setting in the US, which is characterized by (i) a 
―bottom-up attitude‖ in the sense that universities are wholly responsible for 
designing their own strategies, (ii) competition among universities for research funds 
and personnel, and (iii) an attitude that encourages commercialisation and 
entrepreneurship.  
 However, several studies raise some serious doubts about the validity of the 
above claims. Jacobsson et al. (2013), Granberg and Jacobsson (2006), for instance, 
argue that the results of some studies have given rise to a set of dominant false beliefs 
in Sweden. One of such beliefs, in particular, depicts scientists as anti-social, self-
sufficient ‗hoarders‘ of scientific knowledge, who are also generally uninterested in 
sharing the benefits accruing from their research with the rest of the society. In a 
nutshell, as Hellström and Jacob (2005) note, scientists are often depicted as 
recalcitrant, and therefore ―...in a need of management‖ (p.444). Such a belief, 
however, finds very little support in the empirical research to date. Granberg and 
Jacobsson (2006) refer to the results of several empirical studies showing that 
scientists in Sweden are quite active in diffusing scientific knowledge. Similarly, 
Bitard et al. (2008:250) refer to the findings of a few empirical studies showing the 
close connection between science and industry in the field of biotechnology in 
Sweden. Lastly, Swedish scientists seem also to be quite active in writing publication 
with both national and international colleagues (Bitard et al.,2008; European 
Commission, 2003).  
 Furthermore, the results of recent empirical studies indicate that the Swedish 
academic system performs exceptionally well in terms of academic entrepreneurship, 
i.e., ―the variety of ways in which academics take direct part in the commercialization 
of research‖ (Henrekson and Rosenberg, 2001: 207). Lawton Smith et al. (2013), for 
instance, found in a comparative study that researchers at the Charmers University in 
Sweden are more active in creating spin-off firms than their counterparts at the 
prestigious Oxford University in the UK. In particular, they found that 75 spin-off 
firms were created at Oxford and 271 firms at Charmers University in the period 
under consideration (e.g., 1997-2009). Similarly, Jacobsson et al. (2013) found in a 
study on academic entrepreneurship that the birth rate of such firms was higher for the 
period between 2003-2010 in Sweden than of that in US and in the UK (for more 
details, see Jacobsson et al., 2003: Table 2). In a nutshell, the results of the above 
studies show that the Swedish academic system performs exceptionally well in terms 
of academic entrepreneurship. 
 Since the examination of the inabilities in the academic system add very little 
that is new to our knowledge of the causes of the Swedish paradox, several studies 
have suggested that the causes of the paradox lie mostly in the domain of economy 
than in that of academia and science. Ejermo and Kander (2006), for instance, note 
that despite the low barriers to entrepreneurship, trade and competitiveness, as well as 
the high level of investments in innovation, Sweden seems to be unable to diversify 
its economic structure (for a similar observation, see Bitard et al., 2008; Marklund et 
al., 2004; Edquist and McKelvely, 1998). With regards to the latter, the predominance 
of large industrial groups has remained intact over the past four decades: only one out 
the of fifty largest firms in Sweden was created during the past four decades (Ejermo 
and Kander, 2006:18). This, as argued elsewhere (e.g., Ejermo and Kander, 2006; 
Edquist and McKelvey, 1998), is in itself a strong sign of weak competitiveness and 
entrepreneurship. Bitard et al. (2008) argue that, despite the high survival rate and the 
increasing birth rate of both high-tech and knowledge intensive business services 
(KIBS) firms, Sweden still lags behind in the creation of new firms and in the 
contribution of these firms to the restructuring and renewal of the economy (see also 
the discussion in Marklund et al., 2004: 22). Moreover, the results of the Third 
Community Innovation Survey show that Swedish firms cooperate less often in the 
process of developing an innovation with other firms and organisations (e.g., 
universities, consultancies, etc.,) than their counterparts in Europe - a pattern that 
seems to be consistent across all sectors of the Swedish economy, except the KIBS 
sector (Bitard et al., 2008:250). Lastly, Swedish firms seem to be less active in terms 
of financing research activities at scientific institutions (Bitard et al., 2008: 250; 
European Commission, 2003: Figures, 3.1.4-5). For example, firms and non-profit 
organisations financed only 11 percent of the total budget of universities in 2010 
(Chaminade et al. 2010: 7). The above discussion, therefore, indicates that the 
Swedish paradox could be an outcome of entrepreneurial, networking and knowledge 
transfer problems and inabilities, especially on the part of firms. 
 Returning to the predominance of MNEs, two related explanations have been 
proposed with regards to our understanding of the causes of the Swedish paradox. The 
first explanation refers to lock-in problems and the second one to globalisation of 
production. Edquist and McKelvey (1998), for instance, show in their seminal 
publication that, despite investing heavily in R&D activities since the 1950s, the 
Swedish economy is mostly specialised in non high-tech products, except the case of 
telecommunications which is mostly due to the activities of a few firms such as the 
Ericsson Group (Chaminade et al., 2010:4). Subsequent contributions (e.g., Bitard et 
al., 2010; Marklund et al., 2004) have not only confirmed this observation, but also 
extended it further. For instance, Marklund et al. (2004: Figure 9.2) show that a 
significant portion of business R&D activities in Sweden are conducted by MNEs in 
the telecommunications, automotive, pharmaceuticals, engineering and machinery 
industries; most of which have a foreign ownership structure. Bitard et al. (2008) 
point out that ―the dominance of MNEs has contributed to the Swedish paradox by 
diminishing commercialization of research results and maintaining a 
disproportionately high allocation of R&D resources to low- and medium-technology 
sectors with little potential for growth‖ (p.262). In addition, Marklund et al. (2004) 
cite empirical evidence showing that Swedish firms display ―...a rather low rate of 
value-adding innovation... in terms of genuinely new products‖ (p.21), as well as that 
the Swedish industry is considerably more competitive in adopting existing product 
innovations than in creating new ones. For Marklund et al. (2004) the latter indicates a 
competitive economy in the sense of being capable of adapting to new technological 
changes through imitation and process innovation. For others (e.g., Chaminade et al., 
2010; Bitard et al., 2008; Edquist and McKelvey, 1998), however, it is a symptom of 
lock-in problems, that is, of heavy concentration on low and medium-tech sectors of 
the contemporary economic landscape. 
 Edquist and McKelvey (1998) argue that the high specialisation of Sweden in 
low and medium-tech sectors can not only be attributed to micro (firm-specific) 
factors, but also to macro (political and institutional) factors. Following David Teece's 
(e.g., 1988) early contribution on core capabilities, Edquist and McKelvey (1998) 
argue that, on the one hand, it is reasonable that Swedish MNEs invest heavily on low 
and medium-tech products, since they possess the necessarily capabilities to produce 
competitive products on their respective markets. On the other hand, however, it is 
quite questionable that sizeable and resourceful profit-seeking firms do not consider 
investments in high-tech products as an opportunity to diversify their product range, 
thus also to enhance their competitiveness. Edquist and McKelvey (1998) argue that 
such behaviour has not only to do with firm-specific factors (e.g., strategies and 
decisions), but also with macro factors such as economic policies. In particular, they 
argue that one of the most important policy tools for boosting the exports and 
competitiveness of the Swedish economy has for a long time been based on devaluing 
the national currency, the Swedish Krona. This, and in conjunction with several 
economic policies that gave little incentives to firms in terms of developing and 
exploiting new product innovations, have made it - especially during the 1980s and 
1990s – ―...more profitable to export the same old products, produced in the same old 
way‖ (p.142) than developing new products and  production techniques. Therefore, 
Edquist and McKelvey (1998) conclude that certain macro-economic factors and 
policies in the 1980s and 1990s have reinforced further the significance of MNEs in 
the economy (see also the discussion in Marklund et al., 2004: 54-57; Henrekson and 
Jakobsson, 2001).    
 Since the innovation potential of Sweden is heavily dependent upon the 
activities of Swedish MNEs, this opens up the possibility that the Swedish paradox 
can also be caused by the production activities of such firms. Edquist and McKelvey 
(1998) are among the first to propose that the paradox is partly caused by the 
globalisation of production. In particular, they argue that Swedish MNEs tend to 
conduct most of their R&D activities in Sweden, while the end product of R&D 
efforts are produced elsewhere. As Marklund et al.,2004) point out Swedish MNEs 
―...find Sweden considerably more attractive for R&D activities than for 
production...‖ (p. 13). In other words, Swedish MNEs ―...have made Sweden a 
knowledge producer without domestically translating that knowledge into economic 
value‖ (Edquist and McKelvey, 1998: 140). This, as Bitard et al. (2008: 262) note, has 
created great concern in Sweden, since the ongoing off-shoring and outsourcing of 
more sophisticated forms of production activities abroad threatens the innovative 
capacity of not only the supplying industries, but also ―...what by international 
standards is a quite advanced Swedish structure of subcontracting SMEs‖ (Marklund 
et al., 2004:14). In a nutshell, ―...there is substantial support for the hypothesis that 
the Swedish paradox can be at least partly explained by globalization, in the sense 
that R&D carried out in Sweden increasingly bears fruit in terms of innovations in 
other countries‖ (Bitard et al., 2008, p. 262).  
 Another popular explanation, which complements to a large extent all the 
previous explanations discussed so far, is that of the inefficient innovation system
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particular, Edquist and McKelvey (1998) are among the first to argue that the Swedish 
paradox can be best understood as the outcome of structural problems in the 
innovation system of Sweden. The underlying argument is that the Swedish system of 
innovation had, for several decades, provided relatively little incentives to firms in 
terms of investing in and developing high-tech products and services. On the contrary, 
as Edquist and McKelvey (1998) show, there was a significant scarcity of innovation 
incentives in the 1980s and 1990s which seems to have contributed to the heavy 
specialisation of the Swedish economy in low and medium-tech sectors, as well as to 
its heavy dependence upon the innovation and production activities of a few Swedish 
MNEs. Bitard et al. (2008) examine at length the extent to which the Swedish paradox 
is an outcome of an inefficient national system of innovation. Following Edquist 
(2005), the analysis concentrates upon some of the key activities (or functions) of the 
system, especially upon the abilities of the innovation system to develop, use and 
diffuse innovation. Five main sets of activities were examined: knowledge inputs to 
innovation (e.g., R&D activities); competence building (e.g., training and education); 
demand-side factors (e.g., formation of new markets); provision of constituents (e.g., 
entrepreneurship, networking, interactive learning, and institutions); support services 
for innovation (e.g., incubating, financing and consulting activities); and innovation 
policies related to the above activities. The findings illustrate that the Swedish 
innovation system is strong with regard to R&D and competence building, but weak 
in many other activities such as new firm formation, provision of venture capital, 
incubation support, formation of new markets and labour market flexibilities. In other 
words, the Swedish innovation system is strong on some activities related to the 
development of innovation, and rather weak on many other activities related to the 
development, use and diffusion of innovation (Edquist, 2010; Bitard et al. 2010). 
However, as argued in Edquist (2010), such structural weaknesses that lead to 
inefficiencies and lock-in problems represent not only problems but also unexploited 
opportunities that innovation system-inspired policies should tackle. 
 One of the less popular explanations for the Swedish paradox is that of 
theoretical perspective. In particular, Ejermo and Kander (2006) maintain that the 
underlying observation of the Swedish paradox - that of high R&D investments, low 
and modest high-tech production, exports and growth - rests on a proportional-
mechanistic rationale informed by the scale effects assumption propagated in the early 
endogenous growth theory models (e.g., Grossman and Helpman, 1994; Romer, 
1990). Once such assumptions are replaced by a more complex theoretical 
understanding that acknowledges some of the mechanisms (e.g., inventions, 
innovation and entrepreneurship) through which R&D is transformed to economic 
growth, there seems to ―...no sound reason to expect a strong proportional 
relationship between the level of R&D in a country and its growth performance ‖ 
(Ejermo and Kander, 2006:32). In other words, ―[w]ith lower and more realistic 
expectations, no paradox will exist‖ (Ejermo et al., 2011: 665). However, and 
independently of the theoretical perspective, the Swedish paradox seems to highlight 
that the Swedish innovation system needs to invest a significant amount of resources 
in R&D in order to achieve the same levels of competitiveness and welfare that other 
small national innovation systems in Europe (e.g., Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Norway) achieve with far fewer resources devoted to R&D (see, for example, Figure 
7.2 in Bitard et al. 2008). In this sense, the Swedish paradox constitutes not only an 
unexploited opportunity, as some innovation system scholars argue (e.g., Edquist, 
2010), but also an interesting contrastive regularity that deserves our research 
attention. 
 
4. An Explanatory Typology 
 
 How have the innovation paradoxes under review been theorised and 
explained? Based on the above review, an answer to this question could be given in 
different ways. However, it seems that the various explanations identified throughout 
the present review form in an inductive fashion a typology of four main explanatory 
categories; from which several explanations (e.g., hypotheses) can be drawn (for more 
details, see Figure 1). These four explanatory categories are as follows.  
 Academia-science base explanatory category. This is one of the most popular 
explanatory categories in both literatures under consideration. The underlying 
argument is that an innovation paradox is mainly, or partly, caused by 
problems and inabilities (e.g., technology transfer problems, entrepreneurship 
problems, institutional rigidities) in the academic and scientific system. 
Therefore, explanations belonging to this category seek for answers to an 
innovation paradox in the government-funded sectors of the economy (e.g., 
academia and science). However, empirical research in both paradoxes under 
review has raised significant doubts on the extent to which explanations drawn 
from this category offer genuine knowledge on the underlying causes of an 
innovation paradox. In fact, several empirical studies show that the presumed 
entrepreneurial inabilities of the Swedish academic system are largely 
fallacious. This, in turn, raises two important questions: 'why such explanation 
were proposed at the first instance?', as well as 'why policy-makers have taken 
the validity of such explanations for granted?'. It would be interesting to 
speculate at length on both these questions. For the purposes of this paper, 
however, it will suffice to say that the early research on innovation paradoxes 
(i.e., late 1990s and early 2000s) seems to have reinforced the belief that the 
European academic-scientific system is not quite efficient in commercialising 
scientific research and knowledge. It must also be emphasised that the policy 
discourse on innovation paradoxes has been somewhat slow in incorporating 
the results of innovation studies that disprove dominant beliefs.  
 Economic base explanatory category. Since the academic-scientific system 
has nothing, or at best little to do, with the occurrence of an innovation 
paradox, empirical research in both paradoxes under review has gradually 
sought for explanations in the domains of firms and industries. While early 
research on the European paradox (e.g., Tijssen and van Wijk, 1999) has 
highlighted the weaknesses of the European industry in terms of developing 
and commercialising promising scientific discoveries, it is in the empirical 
literature of the Swedish paradox that a few interesting explanations have been 
proposed and advanced over the past decade. Key explanations include: the 
increasing 'nationalisation' of R&D activities versus the increasing 
globalisation of production; lack of certain innovation capabilities, especially 
in terms of investing in new high-tech products; lack of network and 
technology transfer activities, especially with regards to innovation co-
operations; and technological lock-in problems on the part of both firms and 
industries. To put it simply, explanations falling into this explanatory category 
propose that an innovation paradox is an outcome of certain activities and 
inabilities of the industrial base in the economic unit under consideration. 
Promising it may sound, there has been scant empirical research on the 
European paradox from the standpoint of this explanatory category. For 
instance, and given sufficient data availability, it will be interesting to 
investigate the extent to which the EU economic base suffers from 
technological lock-in problems, as well as the influence of both micro and 
macroeconomic factors on such problems.  
 Innovation system explanatory category. This is one of the most popular 
explanatory categories in the Swedish paradox literature. The underlying 
proposition of this explanatory category is that the Swedish innovation system 
suffers from some structural problems and inabilities, which have led over 
time to several inefficiencies, especially in terms of providing incentives to 
firms as well as in terms of transforming the high investments to R&D into 
wealth-and employment creating innovations. Compared to the rest of the 
explanatory categories, the innovation systems category seems to be the only 
one that is - at least a priori - able to combine in a flexible, holistic and 
interdisciplinary manner (Edquist, 2005) several of the explanations identified 
in the previous explanatory categories. In addition, the innovation systems 
explanatory category seems to offer interesting arguments relevant for both 
theory and policy. While the inefficient innovation system explanation has 
been proposed and examined in the context of the Swedish paradox since the 
late 1990s, no study has so far examined its explanatory power in the context 
of the European paradox. This, perhaps, can be attributed to the absence of a 
coherent innovation system in Europe (for a discussion on this, see 
Caracoustas and Soete, 1997). Nevertheless, it would be interesting to 
examine in a comprehensively comparative manner the Swedish innovation 
system with another 'innovation paradox-free' national innovation system in 
Europe (e.g., Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands are some candiadates). 
Perhaps, such a comparative approach may lead to interesting insights, 
relevant for both theory and policy.  
 Validity explanatory category. The previous three explanatory categories 
offered a set of complementary explanations for the occurrence of an 
innovation paradox. However, the validity explanatory category consists of a 
few competing explanations, in the sense of providing explanations which 
doubt the existence of an innovation paradox. In other words, explanations 
belonging to this category argue that an innovation paradox does not exist in 
the real world. As shown throughout this review, such explanations take the 
form of either/both empirical validity or/and theoretical validity explanations. 
The first set of explanations proposes that an innovation paradox is mostly due 
to methodological problems and inaccuracies, both of which have to do with 
measuring innovation inputs and outputs properly. The second set of 
explanations argues that an innovation paradox is a matter of theoretical 
perspective, not an outcome of real economic structures and forces. Broadly 
speaking, one of the key merits of the validity category lies in its ability to 
draw our attention - prior to the initiation of a detailed empirical study - on the 
possibility that an innovation paradox may rest on both/either shaky empirical 
and/or theoretical grounds. However, one of the key demerits of this 
explanation is that it provides little knowledge and guidance on how to deal 
with a genuine innovation paradox.  
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5. Concluding Remarks and Suggestions for Future Research 
  
 This paper has provided an extensive review on the empirical literatures on 
both the European paradox and the Swedish paradox. An important finding concerns 
the observation that empirical research in the paradoxes under review fall, in one way 
or another, into a four-fold typology of explanations; from which a number of 
competing and complementary explanations can be drawn. Another observation 
pertains to the multi-determined and socially-constructed nature of innovation 
paradoxes, meaning that the occurrence of an innovation paradox can be determined 
by multiple forces and factors. However, much of the empirical research reviewed in 
this paper seems to have underestimated this essential fact. This is, in turn, leaves 
abundant room for theoretical reflection with regards to examining an innovation 
paradox from a more holistic theoretical approach that combines explanations from 
more than one explanatory category. In this respect, the innovation systems category 
seems to have an advantage, since, and as argued extensively elsewhere (e.g., Edquist, 
2005; Lundvall et al., 2003), it constitutes one of the most holistic theoretical 
approaches currently available in innovation studies. 
 Another observation pertains to the very essence of an innovation paradox, 
i.e., the observation of 'high-inputs-low outputs'. As every regularity in the human 
social world, an innovation paradox is an observation limited to a specific spatio-
temporal context, meaning also that is subject of change due to purposeful human 
behaviour including innovation policies. Therefore, once an innovation paradox has 
been identified, empirical research must proceed as fast as possible, if it is to make a 
valuable contribution to our knowledge about the causal factors that may have 
brought about the contrast in observation. For instance, empirical research can begin 
by examining the both theoretical and empirical validity issues, followed by a fully-
fledged empirical inquiry on the underlying causes of the paradox in question. With 
regards to the spatio-temporal nature of innovation paradoxes, it appears that the 
reviewed research has largely neglected the geographical character of innovation 
activities. This seems to be a crucial omission, given that innovation activities are 
highly localised and unequally dispersed across the geographical landscape (e.g., 
Crescenzi and Rodríguez‐ Pose, 2012; Asheim and Gertler, 2005). This, therefore, 
opens up the possibility of identifying and investigating at length innovation 
paradoxes at the regional level (e.g., Fragkandreas, 2013; Oughton et al., 2003).  
 Another observation relates to an evident lack with regards to discussing on 
the theoretical perspectives that have been informing both the theoretical and political 
discourses on innovation paradoxes. Based on this review, it seems that most of the 
discourse on innovation paradoxes rests on a latent proportional-linear rationale, 
which is, in turn, informed by the mainstream economic paradigm (e.g., endogenous 
innovation models) in general, and the linear model of innovation in particular (see 
also the discussion in Edquist, 2014). This is quite surprising, given that such a 
rationale has extensively been criticised during the past two decades or so by both 
evolutionary economists (see, for example, Castellacci, 2007; 2006) and innovation 
system scholars (e.g., Lundvall et al., 2003) for not only its extremely limited ability 
to conceptualise the complex and dynamic nature of innovative activities, but also for 
providing a rather oversimplified and static perspective on the complex mechanisms 
through which innovation contributes to economic progress. This, however, does not 
necessarily mean that a mainstream-informed and identified innovation paradox is of 
little relevance to evolutionary-institutional economic research as some scholars 
argue. After all, the explanatory power of a theoretical perspective is best illustrated 
in causal explanatory research. Speaking of theoretical perspectives, it would also be 
interesting to conceptualise and analyse innovation paradoxes from a (Post-
)Keynesian perspective, in particular emphasising the significance of demand sided 
factors (e.g., Audretsch and Link, 2012; Edler and Georghiou, 2007)
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may cast light not only to several so far unaddressed demand-related causal factors of 
innovation paradoxes, but it may also illustrate the inherent limitations in innovation 
policies, especially of those which aim to tackle an innovation paradox by addressing 
only the supply side factors of it.  
 Lastly, another observation pertains to the quality of data collection techniques 
and analysis that have been employed and used in innovation paradoxes research. In 
general, the extant research on innovation paradoxes has so far been exclusively 
utilising quantitative methods. For instance, none of the reviewed studies has recorded 
the views of the key innovation agents (e.g., business associations, policy-makers, 
labour unions, entrepreneurs etc.) with regards to the underlying causes of both 
European paradox and Swedish paradox. This seems to be a crucial omission, given 
that innovation activities are social activities based on the actions and interpretations 
(e.g., meaning) of innovation actors. In this sense, quantitative methods are inherently 
limited when it comes to recording meaning, as well as when it comes to examining 
the influence of contextual factors. Therefore, future research may also consider 
employing in a triangulating fashion both quantitative and qualitative methods such as 
combining interviews, documentary analysis, network analysis and statistical analysis. 
For instance, network analysis can be used alongside statistical analysis, interviews 
and documents for assessing the explanatory power of a proposed explanation (e.g., 
network, technology transfer problems, globalisation of production, etc.). 
Methodologically speaking, therefore, a more pluralistic approach to investigating 
innovation paradoxes may also help us sharpen our appreciation of the nature and 
causes of innovation paradoxes.  
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7. Notes 
1. To anticipate a possible critique, research in innovation paradoxes (especially in the Solow 
paradox) has been the subject of a few stock-taking exercises (e.g. Macdonald et al., 2000). 
However, none of these attempts has been published in innovation-related journals, as well as 
none of these contributions reviews the empirical literature from the standpoint of innovation 
theory. This, however, does not mean that the findings of such reviews have no relevance to 
both innovation theory and research.  
2. However, Dosi et al. draw no comparison with Japan. This, perhaps, may be attributed to data 
availability issues. It will be interesting to see whether Japan outperforms Europe in this 
respect, or otherwise.  
3. An innovation system can be understood as consisting of ―...economic, social, political, 
organizations, institutional and other factors that influence the development, diffusion and use 
of innovations‖ (Edquist, 2005: 182).  
4. The author is indebted to Professor Jesper Jespersen for bringing this point.  
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